Abstract: In many pairing-based cryptosystems, the secret keys are elements of bilinear groups. For safeguarding such secret keys or decrypting or signing in a threshold manner, Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) in bilinear groups is required. In this paper, we show a method of verifiably sharing a random secret in a bilinear group. Our method is simple and practical. It can be regarded as a generalisation of threshold linear VSS in finite fields to the case when the secrets are in bilinear groups. We present a general scheme for verifiably sharing secrets in bilinear groups. A modified version of our general scheme with improved efficiency is also introduced.
Introduction
Secret sharing (Shamir, 1979; Blakley and Kabatianskii, 1994 ) is a significant technique for safeguarding very confidential information such as cryptographic keys. It has been identified as a fundamental tool in key management, threshold cryptography, and secure multi-party protocols, etc. In a secret sharing scheme, a dealer who holds a secret distributes shares of the secret among a set of participants in such a way that only some qualified subsets of participants can later recover the secret when pulling their shares together. Many of the traditional linear secret sharing schemes are a type of secret sharing schemes where the secret to be shared is an element of a finite field F, and each share is computed as a fixed linear function of the secret and some random field elements chosen by the dealer. In a (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme, there are n participants, and t or more participants form a qualified subset. The famous Shamir's (1979) (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme is a typical linear threshold secret sharing scheme.
Verifiable secret sharing (VSS for short) was first proposed by Chor et al. (1985) to deal with the problem of cheating from the dealer in traditional secret sharing schemes. In a VSS scheme, participants are able to verify whether the shares they received from the dealer are valid. And in the reconstruction phase, each participant can check if the shares submitted by the other cooperators are correct. Techniques for verifiably sharing a secret that is an element of a finite field have been studied for many years. By now, many schemes within this category, either the threshold ones (Chor et al., 1985; Rabin and Ben-Or, 1989; Feldman, 1987; Pedersen, 1991) or the generalised ones (Zhang et al., 2002) , have been available. Nevertheless, there are only a few VSS schemes for sharing a random element of a bilinear group. Baek and Zheng (2004a) investigated such VSS for the first time. They introduced two VSS schemes in bilinear groups as building blocks of their expected IDbased threshold signature and decryption schemes. Their work uses the polynomial interpolation method proposed by Shamir (1979) to share the secret and consequently belongs to a particular case of threshold linear VSS.
In this paper, we study the topic of threshold linear VSS in bilinear groups. We generalise the technique of threshold linear VSS in finite fields to the case of bilinear groups. Our method of threshold linear VSS in bilinear groups results in a class of secret sharing schemes that include Baek and Zheng's work as a special case. We give analysis for the correctness and the security of the newly proposed scheme in detail. Additionally, we also show a modified version of our scheme that effectively reduces the computational cost for sharing.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we give some basic notions with respect to bilinear pairing and VSS. Then in Section 3, we shortly review Beak and Zheng's (2004a) VSS that uses the polynomial interpolation in bilinear groups. In Section 4, we give a detailed description of our VSS scheme in bilinear groups and heuristically analyse its security. After that in Section 5, we show a modified scheme with lower computational cost and analyse its efficiency. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude the paper.
Preliminaries and definitions
In this section, we give some basic notions with respect to bilinear pairing and VSS.
Bilinear pairings
Let G and G T be two groups of order q for some large prime q. Suppose G is an additive group and G T is a multiplicative group, respectively. A map ˆ:
is called a bilinear map or a bilinear pairing if it satisfies the following conditions (Wu and Tseng, 2011; Kiltz and Pietrzak, 2010; Boneh and Franklin, 2001; Gentry, 2006; Boneh and Boyen, 2004 
These operations are defined in a very simple and natural way as follows.
Verifiable secret sharing
A verifiable secret sharing scheme is a secret sharing scheme that requires the dealer to broadcast some verification information such that each participant can verify the validity of his share. Here, we briefly review the communication model, the building blocks and the security requirements of a VSS scheme.
Communication model
A VSS scheme involves n participants 1 ,..., n P P and a dealer D. They are connected by a complete network of private point-to-point channels and have access to a dedicated broadcast channel.
Building blocks
A VSS scheme contains three basic algorithms as follows:
 Algorithm of distribution: This algorithm is executed by the dealer to publish commitments that used for verification and distribute shares to the participants.
 Algorithm of verification:
The participants run this algorithm to verify whether the shares they received are valid.
 Algorithm of reconstruction:
A qualified subset of participants executes this algorithm to recover the shared secret together.
Security requirements
Assume a static and strong admissible adversary (Gennaro, 1996) , i.e. the adversary has determined which participants to corrupt at the start of the protocol, and can corrupt less than t participants totally. A secure VSS scheme should satisfy the following requirements.
 The adversary cannot acquire the secret from public information.
 The adversary cannot calculate the secret from the shares of those corrupted participants.
 The adversary cannot prevent the t or more honest participants from reconstructing the secret.
Related works
In this section, we briefly review the method of sharing a point in a group G (Baek and Zheng, 2004b) and Baek and Zheng's (2004a) VSS that uses the polynomial interpolation in bilinear groups.
Secret sharing over G  Parameters
Let G be a group of a prime order q. Suppose the dealer D holds a random secret * S G  to be shared among n participants 1 ,..., n P P and t is the threshold such that
.., i n and secretly send S i to P i .
 Reconstruction phase
denotes the cardinality of a given set. The secret can be reconstructed by computing
Beak and Zheng's VSS in bilinear groups

 Parameters
Let ( , , , , ) T G G q P e be a set of parameters as defined in Section 2, i.e. G is a bilinear group of a lager prime order q, P is a generator of G such that computing discrete logarithm with respect to the basis P is infeasible in G and ê is a bilinear map. Suppose * S G  is the secret to be shared. The number of participants is n and the threshold is t with the restriction 1 < t n q   . Note that here the operation in group G is denoted by addition.
 Algorithm of sharing
2 Send S i secretly to P i for = 1,..., i n. Broadcast 0= ( , ) E e S P and = ( , )
i i E e A P for = 1,..., 1 i t .
 Algorithm of verification
When P i has received his share S i it verifies if
If the verification fails, the share S i assigned to P i is invalid.
 Algorithm of reconstruction
Without loss of generality, we suppose 1 ,..., t P P be the t participants to reconstruct the shared secret. Each P i broadcasts his share S i to the other cooperators, and every participator can check its validity through equation (1). For = 1,..., i t, while all S i have been verified to be valid, every cooperator can reconstruct S by computing
Linear threshold VSS in bilinear groups
In this section, we integrate the techniques of linear threshold VSS in finite field and Beak and Zheng's VSS in bilinear groups to get a method of linear threshold VSS in bilinear groups. In what follows we give a detailed description of the resulted VSS scheme and a heuristic analysis on its security.
Description of the scheme  Parameters
Let G be an additive cyclic group of a large prime order q, G T a multiplicative group of the same order, and ˆ:
is a bilinear map. Let P be a generator of G such that the discrete logarithm problem with basis P in G and the discrete logarithm problem with basis ˆ( , )
e P P in G T are intractable. D is the dealer, 1 2 , ,..., n P P P are the n participants (or share holders), and t is the threshold. Both the secret space and share space are G. Suppose the secret to be shared is a random element S G  . 
If the equation does not hold, then the share S j given to P j is invalid.
 Reconstruction
When the distribution is verified to be correct, any t or more participants can cooperatively reconstruct the secret. Assume 1 ,..., 
Correctness
To show the correctness of our scheme, we need to check the correctness of the equation for verification and correctness of the formula for reconstructing the shared secret.
Correctness of verification
On the one hand, if D performs the algorithm of distribution correctly, then the following equation holds: 
Correctness of reconstruction
Security
We analyse the security of our scheme according to the security requirements given in Section 2.
Theorem 1: Under the difficulty of calculating discrete logarithm to the basis P in G, the probability for the adversary to acquire the secret from public information is 1/q.
Proof:
The public information is , , ( = 1,..., )
As the discrete logarithm to the basis P is difficult to calculate in G, the discrete logarithm to basis ˆ( , )
e P P in G T is intractable too. Thus, the adversary cannot calculate B i from = ( , ) t B B B , the adversary has to guess S from the secret space G. That is, the probability for the adversary to acquire the secret from public information is 1/q. As q is a large prime, the probability 1/q can be neglected. We can conclude that under the intractability of calculating discrete logarithm to the basis P in G, the adversary cannot acquire the secret from public information.
Theorem 2: An adversary who corrupts up to 1-1 participants cannot get any information about the shared secret except what is implied by the public information.
Proof: According to the algorithm of reconstruction, to acquire the secret S, the adversary has to get t or more shares. Thus he/she needs to calculate at lest one more shares of honest participants from the shares of those corrupted ones. From Theorem 1, we know that the adversary cannot acquire the vector B from public information. However, according to the algorithm of distribution, to acquire the shares of those honest participants, the adversary has no choice but compute B merely using the shares of the corrupted ones. Without loss of generality, we suppose that the corrupted participants are 1 1 ,..., t P P  , the adversary has to compute 1 ,..., t B B from the following system of equations: 
t t t t t t t t t lS C B c B c B c B S C B c B c B c B S C B c B c B c B
This system of equations has t unknowns ( 1 ,..., 
It is obvious that this system of linear equation (5) (5) is 1 t  , it has exactly q solutions. Thus, the system of equation (4) has also exactly q solutions. In these q solutions, only one is the correct 1 ,..., t B B used by the dealer in the distribution phase. So the probability for the adversary to get the correct 1 ,..., t B B , and hence get the shared secret is 1/q.
Theorem 3: When
( 1)/2 t n   the adversary cannot prevent t or more honest participants from reconstructing the secret.
Proof: From the definition of static and strong admissible adversary, we know that the adversary has determined which participants to corrupt at the start of the protocol, and can corrupt less than t participants totally. This means there are at least n-t+1 honest participants. As
( 1)/2 t n   , the number of honest participants is not less than 1 n t t    . So, we can conclude that the adversary cannot prevent the t or more honest participants from reconstructing the secret when
( 1)/2 t n   .
Computational cost
To analyse the computational cost of our scheme, here we just count those time-consuming operations in different phases. Let  ,  and  denote the operation of bilinear pairing from G 2 to G T , scalar multiplication in G and exponentiation in G T , respectively. In the distribution phase, we consider the computational cost of D in calculating all the public information and shares; in verification phase, we consider the cost for all of the n participants in verifying their shares; and finally in the reconstruction phase, we assume there are t participants and the cost of verification is not included. The result is listed in Table 1 . Table 1 Computational cost of the new scheme in different phases
From Table 1 we can see that in the distribution phase, the new scheme takes t bilinear pairings and nt scalar multiplications in G and in the verification phase, it needs n bilinear pairings and nt exponentiations in G T . The reconstruction phase just needs t scalar multiplications in all.
A modified scheme with improved efficiency
In this section, we show a modified scheme with higher efficiency compared with the previous one. This scheme demands the dealer knows the discrete logarithm of the secret, thus it applies to situations where the secret can be generated by the dealer firstly choosing its discrete logarithm. We just give the description of the modified scheme and analyse its efficiency. The analysis of correctness and security are similar to that of the previous one and hence is omitted.
Description of the scheme
 Parameters
The common parameters ˆ (  , , , , , ( , ), , ) T G G e q P e P P n t are defined the same as before. G and G T are groups with the same large prime order q where G is an additive group and G T is a multiplicative group. P is a generator of G such that computing discrete logarithm to the basis P in G is intractable. ˆ: 
 Reconstruction
When the distribution is verified to be correct, any t or more players can cooperate to reconstruct the secret. Assume 1 ,..., k P P are k ( k t  ) participants intend to recover S, they firstly 
Computational cost
To compare the computational cost of the newly proposed scheme with Baek and Zhang's scheme in Section 3 and the scheme proposed in Section 4, we count those time-consuming operations in different phases and list them in Table 2 . The notation is defined the same as in Section 4. 
From Table 2 , we see the modified scheme takes less bilinear pairings totally than the former two, and scalar multiplications in this scheme are reduced. As computing bilinear pairings are the most time-consuming operation, it is reasonable to say that the modified scheme has a smaller computational cost.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated VSS in bilinear groups. Two linear threshold VSS schemes in bilinear groups have been presented. The first scheme is a general one for sharing any randomly chosen secret in a bilinear group; and the second one is a modified scheme with improved efficiency for sharing a secret whose discrete logarithm is known to (and only to) the dealer. Our sharing method is a generalisation of the technique of linear VSS in finite fields to the case of bilinear groups. And hence our schemes can be applied in safeguarding the secret keys of some pairing-based cryptosystems, distributed key generation for cryptosystems with secret keys in some bilinear groups and public keys in the range groups of the corresponding bilinear pairings.
